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Operations Research: Some Experimental 
Applications 
N Tyabji 
It was in the late 1930s that the Royal Air Force, while experimenting with new radar stations, 
made the revolutionary discovery that the scientific placing of radar stations was a problem quite distinct 
from the technological one of making individual stations work reliably. What was even more revolution-
ary was the choice of leading physical and biological scientists to solve the problem. This use of the 
scientific method of enquiry to solve an operational as opposed to a theoretical problem came to be known 
as Operational Research. 
In view of the circumstances of its origin and growth, OR has come to be seen as merely a way of 
tackling problems by breaking them into smaller problems to make them analytically tractable; the larger 
institutional causes of these problems are considered outside the ken of OR. 
The present paper questions these assumptions and proposes some alternative applications of OR. 
WHATEVER might be the confusion 
regarding the role of Operations Research 
(OR) today, its origin can be traced 
with some exactness. I t was in the 
late 1930s that the Royal Ai r Force, 
while experimenting with new radar 
stations and faced with the problem of 
locating individual stations in such 
a way as to provide the most effective 
early warning shield against German 
bomber attacks,1 made the revolu-
tionary discovery that the scientific 
placing of radar stations was a problem 
quite distinct from the technological 
one of making individual stations work 
reliably. That is, the problem was to 
design a system whose elements con-
sisted not only of the stations, but of 
their relationships (in terms of relative 
position) which would best protect them 
against an opposing system of attack 
(in terms of enemy bombers). The 
clement that was revolutionary was 
the choice of a group of leading phy-
sical and biological scientists to solve 
the problem. This use of the scienti-
fic method of enquiry, which was com-
mon to all the 'natural' sciences, to 
solve an operational as opposed to a 
theoretical problem came to be known 
as 'Operational Research. 
Ackoff has dated the beginning of 
the 'systems age' to roughly the time 
OR work began and it is interesting 
to investigate the possible causes for 
this change in the mode of thinking.1 
One of the objective factors that ap-
pears of some importance is that both 
OR and the Kevnesian method of ana-
lysing problems in the economic sphere 
appeared first in England.5 By the 
1930s, it was clear that England was 
no longer the dominant capitalist 
power. This realisation might have 
been ignored to a certain extent by 
Germany's eclipse after the First 
World War, but after Hitler's invasion 
of the Rhineland in 1936, a new trial 
of strength seemed probable. The 
conventional method of settling such 
trials is similar to the control proce-
dure described by Ross Ashby as the 
basis of football or other two-team 
games.0 For a long period after the 
scientific possibilities of improving de-
fensive tactics had existed in embryonic 
form, subjective awareness of these 
had not crystallised even in Britain 
which was in many ways the most ad-
vanced country scientifically. The rea-
son was that British economic and po-
litical predominance made the wasteful 
effects of inefficient procedures, whe-
ther in war or elsewhere, of little con-
sequence. But the rise of German mi-
litary power, in particular air power, 
made a football game type of one-for-
one defensive strategy more and more 
difficult. Thus proposals for developing 
a new form of control system depen-
dent on science, not only in its use of 
advanced technology but also for or-
ganising a system within which these 
technological elements could be placed, 
became an urgent necessity. 
Evidently, what was required was a 
method of modelling whereby the ac-
tual physical form of the elements was 
abstracted, so that they and the link-
ages between them which may have 
had no physical counterpart could be 
represented, either by a specially de-
signed mathematical model, or by one 
drawn from the physical or biological 
sciences.7 In the latter field, in par-
ticular, workers had long been used to 
working with linkages between physi-
cal elements which had no physical 
counterpart themselves (or for which 
none had been discovered upto that 
time). Thus the specific novelty of the 
OR approach lay in the construction 
of a model to represent the system, 
and in many cases analogies were taken 
from biology and the natural science. 
An important consequence of the 
approach was that many assumptions 
underlying the methods of the social 
sciences were not accepted. Precisely 
because of the naivety of social scien-
tists towards the 'real world', the hurdle 
of the distinction between the norma-
tive and the positive did not hold. If 
their investigations led them to the lo-
gical conclusion that the problem en-
trusted to them could only be solved 
by reference to a larger problem, 
they were much less influenced by the 
argument that as regards the larger 
problem, the existing situation was im-
mutable. For instance, they might 
have found that institutions resting on 
private property were the fundamen-
tal cause for the lack of growth of a 
depressed geographic area in an other-
wise booming economy, 10 while a dili4 
gent economist would have contented 
himself by recommending financial in-
centives for investments in those areas, 
and other useful and practical recom-
mendations. 
During wartime, of course, existing 
institutions are far less sacred, as long 
as changes brought about by studies 
serve the overriding imperatives of the 
war effort. But, in the meantime, the 
various OR groups had found that 
many of the problems they were faced 
with could be broken, or at that stage 
of the development of OR methods 
had to be broken, into smaller pro-
blems to make them analytically tract-
able, and for the solution of which 
standard methods could be developed. 
In many ways this was a fateful de-
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velopment in the evolution of OR. 
After the war a great many of the ori-
ginators of OR joined commercial or-
ganisations which were happy to have 
the services of these eminent investiga-
tors of operational problems, but were 
rather at a loss to know what to do 
with them. For instance if X had been 
employed by Division A of a company, 
its management would hardly take kind-
ly to suggestions that problem Z 
could only be solved effectively by 
the amalgamation of Divisions A and 
13, or worse, by closing down Divi-
sion A's operations because they were 
largely redundant. ''Give us a practi-
cal solution taking account of the cons-
traints within which we operate", they 
were told, and all their energies 
would be spent working out why 
stocks were piling up, or production 
japing down after the introduction of 
Sposedly revolutionising machinery.12 
Many spectacular results were obtained 
this way, and in the process a fruitful 
new academic discipline arose. Eager 
research students in universities were 
given assignments to improve still fur-
ther the mathematics of a technique, 
and to observe the results of variations 
in parameter values irrespective of 
any practical considerations. It must 
however be said that a great deal of 
important work has been done in this 
way in improving algorithms for solv-
ing problems, so that computer-based 
solutions arc more feasible; and that 
in essence there is no reason why aca-
demic work should not continue in 
these lines whether there is any imme-
diate feedback on Operational Research 
or not. 
It is quite another matter, however, 
when this activity in itself is defined to 
be OR, and MAs and MScs in OR to go 
into the world armed solely with a 
knowledge of mathematical techni-
ques.14 For what has happened is 
that an approach that set out to en-
quire into problems whose boundary 
was fixed only by the skill of the prac-
titioner and the final equilibrium 
reached between him and his employer, 
has been diverted to the completely con-
servative technical approach of improv-
ing stock control, smoothing produc-
tion bottlenecks and so on, with no 
room left for questioning the larger in-
stitutional causes of these very real 
technical problems. That is, apart from 
a few persons whose specific experi-
ence has led them to question the role 
of the OR worker, the bulk of the 
profession is happily advancing along 
the road to rational decision-making in 
industry and government, through the 
use of decision-making techniques. 
In fact they may not all be that 
happy, for, particularly in public ad-
ministration, there is little sympathy lor 
this approach; but the point we wish 
to make is that the world view that pre-
sent OR teaching inculcates is largely 
that of assuming that the techniques 
are the essence of real-life problems 
and that it is merely the stupidity of 
their audiences that prevents advocates 
of OR, in this sense, from achieving 
success. Equally dangerously, it pro-
duces a feeling of futility about all at-
tempts to change existing situations, 
for in the training process, no element 
of the dynamics of social change has 
been included,155 At the worst, it pro-
duces an attitude which was said to 
prevail in the Rand Corporation in 
the United States where much of the 
work on military problems was under-
taken. "It's not our job to judge whe-
ther the United States should be fight-
ing in Vietnam or not; that's a politi-
cal/administrative decision and we can 
only advise on the best way of achiev-
ing targets set for us/'16 
Any attempts to define a distinct 
role for OR not confined to these tech-
niques is complicated by the fact that 
many of the social sciences, having 
had to discard their positivist image in 
the wake of the acceptance of Keyne-
sian interventionist policies, have taken 
over many techniques evolved in earlier 
OR studies. Thus econometrics is little 
more than the use of mathematical 
techniques applied to problems which 
neo-classical economies, which denies 
the need for prescriptive measures, 
cannot handle.17 In other words, to 
the extent that the notion of planned 
advance, even if only in discrete seg-
ments of social life, has been accepted 
in capitalist countries, new branches of 
established disciplines have developed 
which carry over the segmented ap-
proach of their parent subjects aided 
by the OR methods they have adopt-
ed It is then as difficult for practi-
tioners of these arts to see that the 
problem (which OR sets out to tackle) 
is not necessarily one that lies within 
a discipline and can be tackled using 
the methods of that discipline as for ad-
herents of the parent discipline. 
Certainly it is true that after the 
operational problem has been viewed as 
a .system of interconnected problems, 
these may be studied individually by 
the methods of existing disciplines; 
hue the solution of the total problem 
is not the sum or any simple function 
of the solutions of the sub-problems. 
These latter have to be integrated in 
a manner which preserves the original 
structural relationships of the problem 
area. The originality of the best OR 
work is due precisely to the use of 
models which span discipline bounda-
ries and thus enable the operational 
problem to be correctly defined. Of 
course, the question arises: what is the 
'correct' way of defining a problem? 
In other words, is a system purely sub-
jective? The most prominent of the ad-
vocates of what we wil l call Opera-
tional Research (OIK)1' as opposed to 
Operations Research (OsR)1!l argue 
that this is so, and this marks them 
off clearly from Marxists.-0 For a 
Marxist, who presumably has a rela-
tively clear conception of the broad 
direction of societal advance, the way 
the problem is defined is based on an 
objective understanding of the situa-
tion; and even if he is unable, because 
of the constraints of his situation, to 
avoid making options too narrow, the 
decision will be based on his morality 
which would in the final analysis de-
fine his approach to the problem. Thus 
to take a simple example where class 
consciousness clearly defines moral con-
ciousness, a Marxist when asked to de-
sign a layout for a shop floor might 
take workers' convenience actively into 
account. The difference between this 
and an approach based on humanistic 
consideration or on the 'human rela-
tions''-1 school, is the consistency with 
which trends favourable to the work-
ing class movement are upheld within 
technical studies. A great deal of de-
bate on 'OR for whom?' has really cen-
tred around this subject, though the ge-
neral Marxist approach seems to be 
that it is impassible to continue in 
a situation where there is a fair likeli-
hood of becoming involved In the de-
sign of precisely calculated anti-work-
ing class policies, whether within a 
production unit or in the capacity of 
a government administrator,22 
The most ambitious attempt to bring 
about a relatively integrated system of 
M-109 
Review of Management November 1976 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL week ly 
M-110 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Review of Management November 1976 
planning has been the PPB experi-
ment in the US Department of De-
f e n c e . I n fact PPB can be seen to 
be the result of the natural logic of 
OR work within single departments or 
other formally separated organisations 
where the analysis of the problem at 
hand has necessitated departmental 
reorganisation, or the development of 
methods of reconciling the integrated 
nature of forward planning, with the 
constraints posed by existing organisa-
tional frameworks. Subsequent expe-
rience and disillusionment with PPB 
applied on a macro-scale clearly shows 
the incompatibility of effective planning 
within a society characterised by pri-
vate property, and upholding an appa-
rently "pluralistic'' ideology.-4 
What is of interest and makes these 
experiments worth studying is that 
providently advanced capitalist societies 
not only producing the social or-
ganisations suited to socialism but also 
developing methods of planning and 
organising within them, however much 
they may be limited by the logic of 
private property and the arbitrary divi-
sions this produces within society, and 
in disciplines supposedly analysing it.2 
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